Putting the Child First in Custody Battles Between Biological Fathers and Adoptive Parents by Kaplan, Paige Kerchner
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 35 | Number 3 Article 5
1-1-1995
Putting the Child First in Custody Battles Between
Biological Fathers and Adoptive Parents
Paige Kerchner Kaplan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Paige Kerchner Kaplan, Comment, Putting the Child First in Custody Battles Between Biological Fathers and Adoptive Parents, 35 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 907 (1995).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss3/5
COMMENTS
PUTTING THE CHILD FIRST IN CUSTODY
BATTLES BETWEEN BIOLOGICAL FATHERS
AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In August of 1993, the Illinois Supreme Court enraged
the state of Illinois, and much of the nation, when it ruled
that the parental rights of the birth father of three year old
Richard had been improperly terminated and thereby over-
turned the child's adoption.1 During the summer of 1993, the
nation witnessed, through the media, the heart wrenching
end to a protracted custody battle between the biological and
adoptive parents of two and one-half year old Jessica De-
Boer.2 Custody was awarded to the biological parents and
the little girl was taken from the only home she had ever
known, and "returned" to her biological parents.3 In San Di-
ego, California, as this comment was written, another cus-
tody battle between a biological father and the prospective
adoptive parents of two and one-half year old Michael raged,
as it had since shortly after the boy was born.4
What is going on here? These cases illustrate the tension
in the nation's independent adoption laws5 among the consti-
tutionally protected rights of biological fathers; the tenuous,
if not non-existent, rights of adoptive parents; and the little
1. See discussion infra part II.A.1.
2. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at
44. Jessica's story became a made for TV movie. Whose Child is This?: The War
for Baby Jessica, (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1993).
3. See discussion infra part IIA.2.
4. See discussion infra part II.D.2.
5. An independent adoption, also referred to as a private placement adop-
tion, means "the placement of a child for adoption by the mother or parents
themselves or by an intermediary like a lawyer or doctor, rather than by an
adoption agency." BLACK'S LAw DICTioNARY 1196 (6th ed. 1990). This comment
uses the terminology adopted by the state of California and refers to private
placement or private adoptions as independent adoptions. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 8524 (West 1995).
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considered, nebulous concept of the "best interests of the
child." This comment will explore the relationship in the
state of California among independent adoption laws, the
rights of biological fathers, and considerations of the best in-
terests of the child, as they are contained in the California
Family Code6 and developed in case law. It will highlight de-
ficiencies in the current law which fail to serve the best inter-
ests of the child, while considering the rights of the child's
biological father and prospective adoptive parents.
The proposed solutions contained in this comment focus
on changes in California independent adoption laws.7 Many
recommendations incorporate the theories and conclusions
from psychological studies of a child's attachment to her par-
ent or caregiver (known as attachment theory)" and the effect
on a developing child of her removal from her primary
caregivers during infancy. 9 These proposals strengthen the
rights of adoptive parents, define and consider the interests
of the child, and preserve the constitutional rights of biologi-
cal fathers.1 ° The solutions within this comment intend to
benefit all parties concerned, but especially the adopted child.
By clarifying the law in the ways proposed, adoptions will be
6. In July of 1992, Governor Wilson approved Assembly Bill 2650. Family
Code, ch. 162, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv., No. 6 (West). The new law reorganized
the statutes pertaining to child, family and human relations into a single Fam-
ily Code. This legislation was given a delayed effective date of January 1, 1994.
CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY BILL No.
A.B. 2650, June 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Cacomm File. A later
bill, Assembly Bill 1500, modified Assembly Bill 2650. Family Law, ch. 219,
1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 6 (West). By creating the Family Code, the legisla-
ture sought to alleviate difficulties in understanding and interpreting existing
laws that occurred because of the scattered placement of family law throughout
many California code sections. The legislature sought to make the law more
consistent, to collect it in a more usable format, and to make the statutes more
accessible and understandable through their organization in a more logical for-
mat. CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY BILL
No. A.B. 2650, June 9, 1992 available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Cacomm File.
7. See discussion infra part V.
8. Attachment theory involves the study of early relationships between an
infant and her primary caregiver. Psychologists consider the formation of this
first close and intimate relationship a "fundamental requirement for adequate
human development." Eleanor Willemsen, In the Best Interests Of Babies: At-
tachment Issues in Infant Placement Decisions (unpublished proposal, on file
with author, Psychology Department, Santa Clara University). See also discus-
sion infra part II.E.1-2.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 197-202.
10. See discussion infra part V.
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facilitated rather than curtailed by the threat of protracted
custody battles between biological and adoptive parents.
Part II of this comment examines the separate court deci-
sions which overturned the adoption of Baby Richard and
prevented the adoption of Jessica DeBoer, leading in respec-
tive removals from the homes of their prospective adoptive
parents and permanent placement with their biological par-
ents.1' Next, it outlines independent adoption law in Califor-
nia, and recent legislative changes. 12 This part then summa-
rizes the California Supreme Court decision which provided
additional rights to putative fathers' 3 seeking custody in Cal-
ifornia. 4 It also details the first lower court interpretation of
the newly-recognized rights for biological fathers. 15 Finally,
part II introduces attachment theory to provide guidance to
the courts regarding the impact of removing young children
from adoptive homes, often the only homes they have ever
known.' 6 Part II1 7 summarizes and Part IV'8 analyzes the
problems presented by the inconsistent and often contradic-
tory judicial decisions and legislative initiatives. Part V pro-
poses solutions to the identified problems.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. National Awareness: The "Baby Richard" and "Baby
Jessica" Cases
Only a small number of adoptions are contested, and an
even smaller number involve situations where the biological
father objects to the adoption.20 The publicity associated
with the overturning of three year old Baby Richard's adop-
tion and the custody battle over two and one-half year old
Jessica DeBoer, however, heightened the nation's awareness
11. See discussion infra part IIA.
12. See discussion infra part II.C.
13. Putative father means "[the alleged or reputed father of a child born
out of wedlock." BLACKs LAw DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). This comment
uses the term "biological father" rather than "putative father."
14. See discussion infra part II.D.1.
15. See discussion infra part II.D.2.
16. See discussion infra part II.E.
17. See discussion infra part III.
18. See discussion infra part IV.
19. See discussion infra part V.
20. Carol McHugh, Experts: Adoption Contests Not Common-But Risks
Are, CH. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3.
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of what can go wrong during independent adoption proceed-
ings. In these two cases, the increased recognition of the
rights of biological fathers added a troublesome issue to in-
dependent adoptions.21 By examining exactly what hap-
pened, legally and procedurally, to Baby Richard and Jessica
DeBoer, better laws to prevent such tragedies for all con-
cerned can be created and implemented.
1. Baby Richard
In August of 1993, the Appellate Court of Illinois af-
firmed the adoption of a two and one-half year old boy, de-
spite the attempt by the birth father to contest the adop-
tion.22 In June of 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court ruling and overturned the final adoption
decree of the trial court. 23 Finally, in February 1995, the
United States Supreme Court denied the application for a
stay of the Illinois Supreme Court's order for the Does "to
surrender forthwith" custody of Richard to his biological
father.2 4
21. Until 1972, a birth father not married to the birth mother possessed
few, if any, parental rights toward his children. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a putative (or biological) father has a
right to gain custody of and care for his children. Id. at 658. In Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the Court distinguished the rights of fathers who
held established relationships with their children from those of fathers who
lacked any real relationship with their children. Id. at 255-56. More recently,
in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), the Court held that the constitutional
rights of an unwed father stemmed from his actual relationship with his child.
Id. at 261-62. For a detailed discussion regarding the development of the rights
of unwed fathers, see generally Elizabeth A. Hadad, Comment, Tradition and
the Liberty Interest: Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 291 (1990); Laurel J. Eveleigh, Comment, Certainly Not Child's Play: A
Serious Game of Hide and Seek With The Rights Of Unwed Fathers, 40 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1055 (1989); and Daniel C. Zinman, Comment, Father Knows Best:
The Unwed Father's Right to Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 971 (1992).
22. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 656 (I1.), and appeal granted, 624 N.E.2d
807 (Ill. 1993), and rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Mll.), and reh'g denied July 12, 1994,
and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), and
application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891,
and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
23. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (IlM.), reh'g denied July 12, 1994, and
cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), and ap-
plication denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891,
and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
24. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
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The subject of these cases is Richard,25 now three years
old. Richard's parents were living together when his biologi-
cal mother became pregnant.26 Before his birth, however,
they had a misunderstanding while his biological father was
out of the country.27 As a result, his birth mother left the
apartment she shared with Richard's father and decided to
place their child for adoption.28 When Richard's biological fa-
ther returned to the United States, he unsuccessfully at-
tempted to reconcile with the child's mother.29 She did not
tell him of her plans for the subsequent adoption of their
child.3 0 After Richard's birth, she lied to his biological father,
telling him the baby had died.31 Richard's biological father
continued his attempts to reconcile with Richard's birth
mother, and, not fully believing that Richard had died, made
attempts to locate his child.3 2 Eventually, Richard's biologi-
cal parents reconciled, and Richard's biological father began
his legal battle to contest his child's adoption.
33
During Richard's adoption proceeding, the trial court
found that the birth father had "failed to demonstrate a rea-
sonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the
welfare of a newborn child during the first 30 [sic] days after
the birth."3 4
In upholding Richard's adoption, the appellate court
made some very sweeping statements about the best inter-
ests of the child. The court began with the premise that Rich-
ard, was not property belonging to either his natural or adop-
25. Richard is a fictitious name given to the young boy who is the subject of
this lawsuit by the appellate court. Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 649 n.1.
26. Id.
27. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 n.1. (Ill.), and appeal granted, 624
N.E.2d 807 (I1. 1993), and rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (iM.), and reh'g denied July 12,
1994, and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499
(1994), and application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 650.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 n.1. (ill.), and appeal granted, 624
N.E.2d 807 (111. 1993), and rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ml.), and reh'g denied July 12,
1994, and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499
(1994), and application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
33. Id. at 650-51.
34. Id. at 651.
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tive parents.3 5 The court affirmatively stated that the child,
Richard, was the real party in interest so that "the best inter-
est of Richard surface[d] as the paramount issue in the
case."3 6 Moreover, the court reasoned that the superior right
of custody of the child, which belongs to the natural parents,
must yield to the best interest of the child s.3  Finally, the
court also emphasized the best interest of the child is "not
part of an equation" and "is not to be balanced."38 Rather, "a
child's best interest is and must remain inviolate and impreg-
nable from all other factors, including the interests of the
parents."39 Accordingly, the court concluded "that it would be
contrary to the best interest of Richard to disturb the judg-
ment of the adoption."40
One of the three justices on the panel vehemently dis-
sented, asserting that the biological father had provided a
complete affirmative defense to the allegation that he had not
met the Illinois statutory standard of "showing a reasonable
degree of interest in the child within 30 days after birth."41
The birth mother lied to him and told him that Richard had
died at birth.42 Moreover, the majority "failed to apply the
multi-factor balancing test indigenous to a best interests
analysis."43 Accordingly, the best interest of the child should
prevail, "only after a hearing of all evidence relevant to the
child's welfare."44 Given the facts of this case, the dissent
stated the majority had reached an erroneous result.45
35. Id. at 651-52.
36. Id. at 652.
37. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 652 n.2. (Ill.) (quoting from Giacopelli v. Flo-
rence Crittenton Home, 158 N.E.2d 613 (11. 1959)), and appeal granted, 624
N.E.2d 807 (111. 1993), and rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (IMI.), and reh'g denied July 12,
1994, and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499
(1994), and application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115
S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
38. Id. at 652.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 654.
41. Id. at 658 (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
42. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 658-59 (Ill.) (Tully, P.J., dissenting), and
appealgranted, 624 N.E.2d 807 (M1. 1993), and rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), and
reh'g denied July 12, 1994, and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), and application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
43. Id. at 662 (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 665 (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
45. Id. (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
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Both the majority and the dissent found fault with the
amount of time it took for this case to proceed through the
court system. The dissent emphatically asserted that deter-
ruination of such custody decisions, "should take no more
than six months."
46
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, reversed the ruling
outlined above.47 Justice Heiple delivered the opinion of the
court, agreeing somewhat with the trial court's lone dissenter
and centering his own analysis around his conclusion that
the trial court's finding was not supported by the evidence.
48
According to Heiple's opinion, both the affirming court and
the trial court had missed the threshold issue-the improper
termination of the parental rights of the biological father.
49
Because the parental rights of the birth father had been im-
properly terminated by the trial court, the appellate court
should not have reached the issue of the child's best interests
and, consequently, the appellate decision upholding the adop-
tion should be reversed.
50
The concurrence, written by Justice McMorrow,5 1 elabo-
rated upon the conclusions reached by Justice Heiple. For
Justice McMorrow, the appellate decision raised two issues:
first, "whether the perceived 'best interests' of the child to re-
main with his adoptive parents outweighed any consideration
of the parental fitness of the [birth father];"52 and, second,
"whether the trial court properly found that [the birth father]
was an unfit parent."53
46. Id. at 664 (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
47. In this plurality opinion, three of the four justices sided with the concur-
rence authored by Justice McMorrow which presented a more comprehensive
discussion of their reasoning for reversing the ruling of the lower court. In re
Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), and reh'g denied July 12, 1994, and cert. denied sub
nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), and application denied,
stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115
S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
48. Id. at 182.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Justices Miller and Freeman joined Justice McMorrow in his concur-
rence. Id. at 187.
52. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 183 (Ill.) (McMorrow, J., concurring), and
reh'g denied July 12, 1994, and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), and application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
53. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring).
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At the time of Richard's adoption, the adoption laws of
Illinois required that the birth parent who witholds consent
to the adoption must be found unfit before his or her parental
rights may be terminated. 54 Unfitness must also be deter-
mined before the court may proceed to evaluate the best in-
terests of the child.55 The concurrence stated that the appel-
late court had been influenced by the time which had elapsed
since the placement of the child with the adoptive parents,
overriding this requirement of the Illinois Adoption Act.56 As
to the second issue, the concurrence determined that the
birth father had not been proven to be an unfit parent.5 v The
permanent nature of termination of parental rights mandates
that unfitness be proven by clear and convincing evidence.5,
Given the facts of the case, and particularly because the birth
mother repeatedly hindered and frustrated any attempts by
the birth father to locate his child, the court found the evi-
dence did not support a finding that the father had failed to
demonstrate sufficient interest in the child.59
The decision unleashed much public outcry, and the Gov-
ernor of Illinois responded by calling for legislative action.6 °
The Illinois legislature subsequently changed the Illinois
Adoption Act in order to prevent the same result from occur-
ring again.6 ' This change in the law, however, did not affect
54. Id. (McMorrow, J., concurring) (citing Illinois' Adoption Act, Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 750, para. 50, 8(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993)).
55. Id. at 184 (McMorrow, J., concurring) (referencing In re Adoption of
Syck, 562 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 1990)).
56. Id. at 185 (McMorrow, J., concurring).
57. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 187 (M.) (McMorrow, J., concurring), and
reh'g denied July 12, 1994, and cert. denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), and application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v.
Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891, and stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995). Illinois law
defines an unfit parent to include a parent who has "fail[ed] to demonstrate a
reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a
new born child during the first 30 days after its birth." Id. at 186 (McMorrow,
J., concurring) (quoting the Illinois' Adoption Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para.
50, I(D)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993)).
58. Id. at 186 (McMorrow, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 187 (McMorrow, J., concurring).
60. Edgar Calls for Special Session on Baby Richard Legislation, CHi.
DAILY L. BULL., July 1, 1994, at 1.
61. Public Act 88-550, among other changes, modified the Illinois Adoption
Act. See generally Family Law-Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Pub-
lic Act 88-550, 1994 IlM. Legis. Serv. No. 3, 381 (West). The most pertinent
changes include: (1) establishing a biological father registry and (2) increasing
the rights of adoptive parents by allowing them to request custody even if the
914 [Vol. 35
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the outcome for Richard. The United States Supreme Court
denied the applications for stay.62 Justice O'Connor would
have granted the stay, however, and in her dissent voiced her
concern that the rationale of the Illinois Supreme Court's or-
der requiring the Does to return Richard forthwith was un-
clear and that the changes to Illinois adoption laws might be
unconstitutional.
63
2. Baby Jessica
Jessica's birth mother decided to give her baby girl up for
adoption.64 She named "Scott" as the father, and Scott also
signed a release of parental rights.65 After a termination
hearing, for which both Jessica's birth mother and Scott
signed waivers of notice, custody of Jessica went to her pro-
spective adoptive parents.66
Two legal actions to reclaim Jessica were then initiated.
Nine days after the prospective adoptive parents filed their
adoption petition, 7 the birth mother attempted to have the
termination set aside by asserting that her release of paren-
tal rights was defective.68 In addition, she asserted that
"Daniel," not Scott, was Jessica's true biological father.
69 At
adoption remains invalid. The law requires that the reviewing court first con-
sider the best interests of the child in making its custody decision. Id.
62. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
63. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64. Ex rel. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1992), aff'd sub nom. In re
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), and stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer,
114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993). Jessica's biological mother
gave birth to Jessica on February 8, 1991. Id. She signed a release of custody
form relinquishing her parental rights two days later on February 10, 1993. In
re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich.), stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. De-
Boer, 114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
65. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
66. Id. The court did not disclose the date of the hearing. It merely stated
that a hearing was held. Id.
67. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 651, 652. The prospective adoptive parents
ified their petition for adoption in Iowa on February 25, 1991. Id. at 652. The
birth mother ified a motion to revoke her release of custody on March 6, 1991.
Id.
68. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241. In her motion, the birth mother alleged that
the release was obtained through fraud, coercion, and misrepresentation of ma-
terial fact. Id. She also alleged that because the full 72-hour waiting period
between the birth and the release of custody had not passed she had good cause
for revocation. Id. She signed the release approximately 40 hours after Jessica
was born. Id. at 243.
69. Ex rel. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Iowa 1992), aff'd sub nom. In re
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), and stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer,
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the same time, a second legal proceeding materialized when
Daniel, Jessica's biological father, decided to assert his pater-
nity, and to contest the adoption in district court.70 After he
proved that he was Jessica's father, the court awarded cus-
tody of Jessica to him.71 Before Daniel could take custody,
however, the prospective adoptive parents appealed and ob-
tained a stay of the district court's order transferring cus-
tody.72 The two cases (the birth mother's set aside motion,
and the birth father's paternity action) were consolidated in
the Iowa Supreme Court.73
Under Iowa law, as interpreted by the Iowa Supreme
Court, "parental rights may not be terminated solely on con-
sideration of the child's best interest," but rather "specific
grounds for termination under [the statute] must also be es-
tablished."74 Here, because the biological father's parental
rights had not been terminated, the adoption was adjudged
fatally flawed. 75 Because the man asserting himself as Jes-
sica's biological father met the required showing for pater-
nity,76 and he had not abandoned Jessica,77 the Supreme
114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993). The birth mother's motion in
juvenile court to set aside the termination of her parental rights failed and she
appealed. Id. On appeal, the court reversed its termination of her parental
rights and remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 241.
74. Ex rel. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992), aff'd sub norn. In re
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), and stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer,
114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993). The Iowa Code section
600.3(2) states "the court may not consider whether the adoption will be for
welfare and the best interests of the child where the parents have not consented
to an adoption...." Id.
75. Id.
76. While the birth mother named another man, "Scott" as the father, blood
tests "showed a 99.99% probability that 'Daniel' was the father and a 0% chance
that 'Scott' was the father." Id. at 246. This, in conjunction with the birth
mother's affidavit naming "Daniel", met Iowa's preponderance of the evidence
standard for paternity. Id.
77. According to Iowa law, abandonment is one of the grounds for termina-
tion of parental rights. Id. Iowa Code section 600A.2(16) defines abandonment
"as the relinquishment or surrendering of parental rights and includes both the
intention to abandon and the acts by which the intention is evidenced." Id. The
burden for a showing of abandonment is "clear and convincing proof." Id. The
majority concluded that the biological father's actions did not suggest that he
intended to abandon the baby, but rather that he "did everything he could rea-
sonably do to assert his parental rights, beginning even before he actually knew
that he was the father." Id. The facts the court considered relevant were the
917PUTTING THE CHILD FIRST
Court affirmed the order of the lower court: the parental
rights of Jessica's biological father had not been properly ter-
minated and the adoption was dismissed.78
In his dissent, Iowa Supreme Court Justice Snell dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion on the issue of whether
sufficient evidence existed to show abandonment. Rather
than beginning his analysis at the time when Jessica's bio-
logical mother told her biological father that he might be the
baby's father, Justice Snell began his analysis in December of
1990, at the time when Jessica's biological father knew that
her biological mother was pregnant.79 Given that the child
was born in February, Justice Snell reasoned that her biologi-
cal father had "knowledge of the facts that support the likeli-
hood that he was the biological father" in December and yet
"did nothing to protect his rights."80 Consequently, Justice
Snell would have remanded for termination of the biological
father's parental rights based on abandonment, denied the
birth mother's motions, and allowed the adoption to pro-
ceed."' Justice Snell found that "[the specter of newly
named genetic fathers, upsetting adoptions, perhaps years
later, [was] an unconscionable result."8 2
After losing in Iowa, the prospective adoptive parents
turned to the courts in their home state of Michigan. The
Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, held that
federal law required Michigan to honor the Iowa court deci-
sion, regardless of the fact that Jessica's best interests had
not been considered.
8 3
biological father's meeting with the attorney 10 days after the birth mother in-
formed him he might be the father. He drove a truck and was out of town on a
road trip during the interim. While he did not yet know the results of the blood
tests, he filed a request to vacate the termination order, and a petition to inter-
vene in the adoption. He made these filings one month after he learned he
might be Jessica's father. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ex rel. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 247 (Iowa 1992), aff'd sub nom. In re
Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), and stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer,
114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), stay denied sub nom. DeBoer
v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993). The Michigan
Supreme Court reasoned that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
[hereinafter UCCJA] and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
[hereinafter PKPA] deprived Michigan courts of jurisdiction over the matter
1995]
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Then, Jessica, through her next friend,8 4 requested that
the United States Supreme Court stay the decision of the
Michigan court pending Supreme Court review. 5 Justice
Stevens denied the application for a stay.8 6 Justice Black-
mun, however, wrote a dissent with which Justice O'Connor
joined. 7 Justice Blackmun found himself unwilling to wash
his hands of the case.88 Two factors influenced him. First,
the decision placed Jessica's personal well-being at risk. 9
Second, a unanimous New Jersey decision supported the pro-
spective adoptive parents' argument.90 Accordingly, he rea-
soned that the fundamental disagreement between the New
Jersey and Michigan courts "over the duty and authority of
state courts to consider the best interests of a child" war-
ranted a closer look by the Court. 91
Her legal avenues exhausted, Jessica DeBoer was re-
moved from the only home she had ever known to be "re-
turned" to her biological parents. 92
B. Uniform Adoption Act
An attempt to address weaknesses in and disparities be-
tween state adoption laws has been made at the national
level with the drafting of a new Uniform Adoption Act.93
Only five states ratified the 1969 revision of the current Uni-
and mandated enforcement of the Iowa Supreme Court decision. Id. at 652.
Moreover, the prospective adoptive parents lacked standing because legally
they constituted third parties in relation to Jessica. Id.
84. "Next friend" means one acting for the benefit of an infant, or other per-
son who is unable to look after his or her own interests or manage his or her
own lawsuits, without being appointed as a guardian. BLACes LAW DICTIONARY
1043 (6th ed. 1990).
85. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1, stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1, stay denied 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993). The
prospective adoptive parents argued that federal law authorized the Michigan
court to modify the custody decree issued in Iowa because the Iowa courts did
not consider Jessica's best interests. Id.; see E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871 (N.J.
1982).
91. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1.
92. Sobbing Toddler Returned to Her Biological Parents, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1993, at A10.
93. Susan Chira, Law Proposed to End Adoption Horror Stories, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A12.
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form Adoption Act.94 The new Uniform Adoption Act would
limit the time frame during which a biological father may
stop the adoption of his child.95 The court handling the adop-
tion would be required to notify the birth father of the im-
pending adoption.96 Upon notification, the birth father would
then have thirty days to respond.97 The uniform law also
would require counseling for the birth parents and would
shorten the time frame in which they can change their minds
after giving up a child for adoption to only eight days.98 In
addition, it would require consideration of the best interests
of the child, as well as the rights of the biological and adop-
tive parents, in situations where a birth father did not know
of the birth and later sought custody.99
C. California Adoption Law
Reacting in part to what happened in Iowa and Michigan
to Jessica DeBoer, the California legislature proposed and en-
acted changes to California's adoption laws. None of these
legislative changes, however, directly addressed the issue of
biological fathers who seek to assert their parental rights
upon finding out about their children months, or even years,
after adoption proceedings have begun or have been
completed.
There are two types of adoptions in California: agency
adoptions and independent adoptions. 100 In an agency adop-
tion, the birth parent relinquishes the child to a licensed
94. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT, 9 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1991). The states which have
adopted the 1969 Revised Uniform Adoption Act are Alaska, Arkansas, Mon-
tana, North Dakota and Ohio. Id. Oklahoma has adopted the original 1953
version of the Act. Id.
95. Chira, supra note 93, at A7. Joan Hollinger, a law professor at the Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall, drafted the new Act. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The father would have to demonstrate his fitness as a parent and
the court would be authorized to examine his "parental record" as to his deal-
ings with any other children he had previously fathered. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Division 13 of the Family Code contains the laws pertaining to adoption
in the state of California. According to the Family Code, "'[a]gency adoption'
means the adoption of a minor,.., in which the department or a licensed adop-
tion agency is a party to, or joins in, the adoption petition." CAL. FAm. CODE
§ 8506 (West 1995). An independent adoption is "the adoption of a child in
which neither the department nor an agency licensed by the department is a
party to, or joins in, the adoption petition." Id. § 8524.
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adoption agency or Department of Social Services. 1° 1 Relin-
quishment of the child, by either birth parent, terminates all
parental rights and responsibilities toward the child.10 2 In
an independent adoption, however, the child is not relin-
quished to anyone. Rather, the birth parent consents to the
adoption of the child by the prospective adoptive parents.10 3
Consent may be withdrawn with court approval. 10 4 Consent
to placement and subsequent adoption differs from relin-
quishment; termination of parental rights of the birth par-
ent(s) comprises a separate step in the process. 10 5
Another fundamental difference between the two types of
adoptions is that the birth parent chooses the prospective
adoptive parents in an independent adoption, 10 6 whereas, in
an agency adoption, the agency is responsible for placement
of the child with adoptive parents. 10 7
This statutory scheme also divides birth parents into
three categories: birth mothers, presumed fathers, and natu-
ral fathers. If the child's father falls within the statutory ru-
bric of a presumed father, consent must be obtained from
both parents in order for a child to be adopted through an
independent adoption.' 08 However, if the child's father is not
a presumed father, i.e. a natural father, then the statute re-
quires only the consent of the child's mother for the adoption
to be effective.' 0 9
101. See id. § 8700(a).
102. Id. § 8700(e).
103. See id. § 8814.
104. Id. § 8815(a).
105. Id. § 8819. Sections 7660 through 7666 provide for the termination of
birth parents rights and proper notification. See generally id. §§ 7660-7666.
106. See id. § 8801.
107. Id. § 8704. See also id. §§ 8708-8710 (placement preferences in agency
adoptions).
108. Id. § 8604. This comment is only concerned with one of the means by
which a man can become a presumed father found in Family Code section
76 11(d) which states that a man is a presumed father if "[hie receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Id. § 7611(d).
Other means to establish the presumption include showing that the man and
the natural mother "are or have been married" or, if he and the natural mother
"attempted to marry each other," that the child's birth occurred during the at-
tempted marriage or within 300 days of its termination if it ended. Id.
§ 7611(a)-(b). After the birth of the child, if the couple married or attempted to
marry, the presumption can be shown by the name on the birth certificate,
obligation to support the child, or receipt of the child into the man's home and
holding the child out as his own. Id. § 7611(c)-(d).
109. Id. § 8605.
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Currently in California, if the natural father wants to
stop an adoption, the court first determines whether he is the
father, and then ascertains whether the retention of his pa-
rental rights serves the best interests of his child. 110 If con-
sent is withdrawn, the court must approve the adoption
based upon an analysis of the child's best interests.'1 '
1. Counseling for Placing Birth Parents
Senator Bergeson authored legislation which made sig-
nificant changes to the independent adoption laws." 2 These
changes were in response to the tragedy surrounding Jessica
DeBoer. Preventing situations like Jessica's from occurring
in California became a legislative goal. 1 3 Consequently, sec-
tion 8801.5, operative January 1, 1995, was added to the
Family Code. This new section provides that the adoption
service provider 1 4 shall advise each birth parent placing a
child for adoption of their rights. 1 5 These rights include: ad-
visement of the alternatives to adoption and alternative types
of adoption, separate legal counsel paid for by the prospective
adoptive parents, and a minimum of three separate counsel-
ing sessions which must each be held on different days and
last at least fifty minutes." 6
110. Id. § 7664(b) (replacing CAL. CIv. CODE § 7017(d)(2)).
111. Id. § 8815(a), (d). The factors to be balanced in an analysis by the court
include, but are not limited to: an assessment of the child's age, the extent of
bonding with the prospective adoptive parent or parents, the extent of bonding
or the potential to bond with the birth parent or parents, and the ability of the
birth parent or parents to provide adequate and proper care and guidance to the
child. Id. § 8815(d). This version of the section remains in effect until January
1, 1995. After that date, consent becomes irrevocable if withdrawn after 120
days. Id. § 8814.5(b). Prior to 120 days, if the birth parent requests return of
the child, the child must be immediately returned. Id. § 8815(b).
112. Senator Bergeson authored Senate Bill 1148, Chapter 1353. Family
Law-Independent Adoptions, ch. 1353, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv., No. 12 (West).
This bill was later modified by Senate Bill 792, Chapter 758. Family Law-
Adoption-Independent, ch. 758, 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv., No. 9 (West).
113. CALIFORNIA COMMITrEE ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY
BILL No. S.B. 792, Aug. 18, 1993 available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Cacomm File.
114. An adoption service provider can be either a licensed private adoption
agency or a licensed clinical social worker with a minimum of five years' experi-
ence with either a licensed adoption agency or the Department of Social Serv-
ices. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8502(a)-(b) (West 1995). Outside of California, an
adoption service provider can be either a licensed adoption agency or a certified
clinical social worker under the laws of that state. Id. § 8502(c).
115. Id. § 8801.5(a).
116. Id. § 8801.5(c),(d).
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2. 120 Day Limit on Revocable Consent
The most significant change imposed by the previously
mentioned legislation also took effect on January 1, 1995.117
The new law gives the placing birth parent 120 days in which
to take action if that parent wants the child back: if the par-
ent takes no action, consent becomes irrevocable and perma-
nent on the 121st day after it is signed.'"" The law concern-
ing withdrawal of consent also changed." 9 Court approval of
the withdrawal is no longer required. Instead, once 120 days
have passed, the consent becomes irrevocable and the birth
parent cannot withdraw his or her consent. 120 The birth par-
ent, however, may request the return of the child at any time
before the 120 day period expires. Upon such a request, the
statute mandates that the prospective adoptive parent imme-
diately return the child to the birth parent.121 For prospec-
tive adoptive parents who harbor concerns that the birth par-
ent requesting the child's return may be unfit or presents a
danger to the child, reporting their concerns is their only re-
course. 122 They cannot use such fears as a basis for not re-
turning the child. 128
3. New Type of Adoption: Identified Adoption
In September of 1992, Governor Wilson approved an as-
sembly bill which created a new form of agency adoption,
called an identified adoption.'2 4 In an identified adoption,
the birth parent relinquishes the child to the agency or De-
partment of Social Services, 125 as in an agency adoption.
117. Family Law-Adoption-Independent, ch. 758, 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv.,
No. 9, Leg. Counsel's Dig. 3426, 3427 (West).
118. See CAL. FAY. CODE § 8814.5(b) (West 1995).
119. Id. §§ 8814.5, 8815.
120. Id. § 8815(a) (operative Jan. 1, 1995).
121. Id. § 8815(b).
122. Id. § 8815(c). The prospective adoptive parents may "report their con-
cerns to the investigating adoption agency and the appropriate child welfare
agency." Id.
123. Id.
124. See Family Law-Adoption-Relinquishment of Parental Rights, ch.
667, 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv., No. 9 (West). See also CALIFORNIA COMMrrrEE
ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDIcIARY BILL No. A.B. 3456, Apr. 8, 1992
available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Cacomm File.
125. Family Law-Adoption-Relinquishment of Parental Rights, ch. 667,
1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 9, § 1, 2580, 2509 (West) (amendment to Cal. Civ.
Code § 222.10(b), now Cal. Fam. Code § 8700(a)).
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However, the birth parent then chooses the prospective adop-
tive parents, 126 similar to an independent adoption.
D. Rights of Biological Fathers in California
1. Adoption of Kelsey S.
The California Supreme Court, in Adoption of Kelsey
S.,127 clearly established that a biological father possesses a
constitutional right to contest an adoption and gain custody
of his child. 128 The court held that the statutory distinction
in California between "natural" fathers, "presumed" fathers,
and birth mothers,129 to the extent that the statutes allow a
mother unilaterally to preclude the biological father from
meeting the statutory requirements and "becoming" a pre-
sumed father, violated the principle of equal protection and
due process guaranteed biological fathers by the federal con-
stitution. 130 This statutory construct allows the state to ter-
minate the parental rights of the biological father upon a
showing that it is in the child's best interest. As part of this
holding, the court stated that "[i]f an unwed father promptly
comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his
parental responsibilities-emotional, financial, and other-
wise-his federal constitutional right to due process prohibits
the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing
of his unfitness as a parent."
131
In Kelsey S., the prospective adoptive parents filed a peti-
tion for adoption alleging that California law required only
the consent of the birth mother to the adoption because the
birth father qualified as a natural father as opposed to a pre-
126. Id.
127. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992). The facts leading up to the placement of
Kelsey S. for adoption are straightforward. The birth mother gave birth to a
boy, Kelsey, in May of 1988. Id. at 1217. Kelsey's biological father was married
to another woman, and his birth mother intended to give Kelsey up for adop-
tion. Id. However, the birth father objected because he wanted to raise the
child. Id. Two days after Kelsey was born, his biological father filed an action
under Civil Code section 7006 (now California Family Code section 7630) to
establish his parental relationship and obtain custody. Id. at 1217-18. As a
result, the court issued an order that temporarily awarded custody to the bio-
logical father and stayed all adoption proceedings. Id. at 1218. However, by
this time the baby was already in the custody of the prospective adoptive par-
ents. Id.
128. Id. at 1236.
129. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7611, 7612, 7614 (West 1995).
130. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1236.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
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sumed father."3 2 Accordingly, state law required the trial
court to determine whether Kelsey's best interests were bet-
ter served by the birth father's retention of his parental
rights or by allowing the adoption to proceed. 133 The trial
court "found 'by a bare preponderance' of the evidence that
the child's best interest required termination of [the biologi-
cal father's] parental rights."13 4 The court of appeal affirmed
the judgment.13 5
In explaining its decision, the California Supreme Court
discussed in detail the statutory framework in California
which creates three different classifications of parents:
mothers, biological fathers who are presumed fathers, and bi-
ological fathers who are not presumed fathers, but rather,
natural fathers. 136 This statutory construct, treats the natu-
ral father differently from either mothers or presumed fa-
thers; his consent to adoption is not required unless he shows
that retaining his parental rights serves the best interests of
132. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1237 (Cal. 1992). The court relied
on Civil Code section 7006(a), now Family Code section 7630, which states that
the child, the child's birth mother or the child's presumed father, according to
section 7611 subdivision (a), (b), or (c) may bring an action to determine the
existence of nonexistence of a father child relationship. CAL. FAm. CODE
§ 7630(a) (West 1995). Section 7611 sets forth the requirements for status as a
presumed father. See id. § 7611.
133. The court relied on the best interest analysis in Civil Code section
7017(d)(2). Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1219. Civil Code section 7017(d)(2) is now
Family Code section 7664 and states:
If the natural father or a man representing himself to be the natural
father claims parental rights, the court shall determine if he is the fa-
ther. The court shall then determine if it is in the best interest of the
child that the father retain his parental rights, or that an adoption of
the child be allowed to proceed. The court, in making that determina-
tion, may consider all relevant evidence, including the efforts made by
the father to obtain custody, the age and prior placement of the child,
and the effects of a change of placement on the child. If the court finds
that it is in the best interest of the child that the father should be
allowed to retain his parental rights, it shall order that his consent is
necessary for an adoption. If the court finds that the man claiming
parental rights is not the father, or that if he is the father it is in the
child's best interest that an adoption be allowed to proceed, it shall
order that person's consent is not required for an adoption. The find-
ing terminates all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to
the child.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7664(b) (West 1995).
134. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1218 (emphasis in original). The appellate court
does not elaborate as to what evidence proved decisive at the trial level. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1219 (emphasis in original).
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his child.1 3 7 The consent of the mother and the presumed fa-
ther, however, are always required, regardless of the best in-
terests of the child.
138
The court dismissed the birth father's argument that
constructive receipt of the child established him as a pre-
sumed father under the statute,13 9 and directly addressed the
constitutional validity of a statute which allows a child's
mother to unilaterally preclude the biological father from ob-
taining the legal right to withhold his consent to his child's
adoption.' 40
While the precise question presented by Kelsey S. had
never before come before the United States Supreme Court,
the Court has handed down a number of decisions pertaining
to the rights of unwed fathers.1 4 1 As part of its discussion,
the California Supreme Court looked to these Court deci-
sions, 142 as well as treatment of the rights of biological father
137. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1219 (Cal. 1992).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1220-22.
140. Id. at 1223.
141. The line of Supreme Court cases begins with Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), which held that a biological father has a right to gain custody
of and care for his children. Id. at 648. Next, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), limited the holding in Stanley by holding that a biological father's due
process rights were not violated where he failed to legitimate his child, had
never lived with nor had a custodial relationship with his child, and had failed
to provide support for his child on a regular basis. Id. at 255. Subsequently,
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) held that a state statute which al-
lowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of an
illegitimate child violated equal protection where the biological father had sub-
stantially participated in the care and custody of his children. Id. at 394. Fi-
nally, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), held that the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit the same protections under the Due Process
Clause as does a demonstration of commitment to parental responsibilities,
and that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated where the biological father
never established a relationship with his child. Id. at 261. See also supra note
21.
142. From the first three decisions the court distilled the following rules: (1)
a court may not terminate the parental rights of a biological father absent a
showing of his unfitness as a parent; and (2) the best interests of the child,
alone, would be an insufficient basis for termination of the parental rights of a
biological father. See Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1223-26 (Cal. 1992).
From Lehr, the court elicited the factor that a biological father could demon-
strate his commitment to his parental responsibilities by making "a reasonable
and meaningful attempt" at establishing a relationship with his child. Id. at
1228.
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by the courts of other states, 143 the California Supreme
Court,1 4 4 and California appellate court decisions 145 in great
detail in order to establish the principles for its own decision.
Guided by these decisions, the Kelsey S. court concluded
that "[a]bsent a showing of a father's unfitness, his child is ill-
served by allowing its mother effectively to preclude the child
from ever having a meaningful relationship with its only
other biological parent." 46 After explaining its holding,147
143. From New York high court decision, In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d
418 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Robert C. v. Miguel T., 498 U.S. 984
(1990), the court found more support for the principal that obtaining a protected
parental interest requires more than a biological connection. Kelsey S., 823 P.
2d at 1229. The biological father must not only be the father, he must behave
like one by promptly doing everything he can to show his willingness and abil-
ity to begin and maintain the fullest possible relationship with his child. Id.
This enables a court to examine the actions of the biological father and avoid
making the "father's rights contingent on the mother's wishes." Id.
144. The California Supreme Court, in an earlier case, invalidated a trial
court termination of a natural father's parental rights using a best interests of
the child standard without determining whether granting custody to the birth
father would be detrimental to the child. Kelsey, S., 823 P 2d at 1230. While
the basis of the decision was statutory, the court suggested that federal consti-
tutional law required parental preference. Id. at 1230. In Kelsey S., the court
summarized its reasoning in Baby Girl M. as follows:
The linchpin of our decision in Baby Girl M. was statutory rather than
constitutional. Section 7017, subdivision (d), . . . set forth the proce-
dure for terminating a natural father's rights before granting an adop-
tion petition. Section 7017, however, did not specify what standard
should be used in determining whether to terminate the father's
rights. Based on the legislative history of section 7017 and prior deci-
sion of this court, we concluded that section 4600 applied to a section
7017 custody hearing. Section 4600 states that before awarding cus-
tody to a non-parent a court must find that an award of custody to a
parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a non parent
is required to serve the best interests of the child.
Id. (citations omitted).
145. The court discussed Adoption of Marie R., 145 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1978)
(holding a mother may prevent a natural father from acquiring presumed fa-
ther status), W.E.J. v. Super. Ct., 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979) (holding a natural
father was not entitled to custody for the purpose of becoming a presumed fa-
ther), and Jermstad v. McNelis, 258 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1989) (holding that section
7017 of the Uniform Parentage Act required the biological father to be given
parental preference where he promptly acknowledges his paternity and seeks
custody of his child). Kelsey, S., 823 P.2d at 1230-31.
146. Id. at 1236.
147. The court characterized the issue before it as whether California's stat-
utory distinction between biological mothers and fathers served "important gov-
ernmental objectives and [was] substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1233 (Cal. 1992) (alteration
in original) (quoting from Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979)). As
part of its rationale, the court emphasized the state's objective as "providing for
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the court elaborated with factors it deemed pertinent to a de-
termination of the biological father's commitment. These fac-
tors included consideration of the father's conduct both before
and after the child's birth.148 As soon as the father "knows or
reasonably should know"149 the birth mother is pregnant, he
should immediately attempt to assume his parental responsi-
bilities as fully as the birth mother will allow and his circum-
stances permit.150 The father must also demonstrate his per-
sonal willingness to assume full custody of his child himself
and not merely his desire to block a planned adoption.151
Other factors include public acknowledgment of paternity by
the biological father, payment of as much of the pregnancy
and birth expenses as his financial situation will allow and
initiating prompt legal action to seek custody of his child.
152
The court qualified its decision as applying only in the
narrow set of circumstances where an unwed biological father
has demonstrated a "full commitment to his parental respon-
sibilities" in a sufficient and timely way.
153
the well-being of illegitimate children" and concluded that adoption was too
narrow an objective. Id. at 1233-34 (quoting from Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 391 (1979)). The court went on to find no evidence of a substantial
correlation between allowing the birth mother to determine the father's rights,
and the child's well-being. Id. It noted anomalies in the statute which provided
more protection against termination of parental rights to mothers who were
"unready, unwilling, and unable" to be a responsible parent than to a father
who was "ready, willing, and able." Id. at 1235. It deemed the distinction be-
tween presumed and natural fathers to be irrational. Id. Moreover, the court
reasoned that the distinction between natural and presumed fathers ignored
the child's best interests, because a fit natural father could be precluded from
contesting an adoption, while a "highly questionable" presumed father could
withhold his consent, unless shown to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 1236.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1237.
152. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1237 (Cal. 1992).
153. Id. The court also examined how cases like Kelsey S. come before the
courts. The mother seeks to sever, as a legal matter, all ties with her child. Id.
at 1236. On the other hand, the natural father desires to assume a parental
responsibility. The court noted that not only was the father being treated un-
fairly, but the statute did not account for the "loss to the child." Id. The court
characterized this loss as the unique genetic bond the child shares with its nat-
ural parents. Id.
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2. Michael H.
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Kel-
sey S., a custody battle began over an infant named Michael
H. in San Diego, California.15 4 The legal fight over Michael
H. presented the first opportunity for the lower courts to ap-
ply the rule formulated in Kelsey S. While the events sur-
rounding Michael H. paralleled Kelsey S.,155 the San Diego
County Superior Court incorporated the child's best interests
in such a way as to allow the prospective adoptive parents to
retain custody.
The relationship between Michael's biological parents
ended before his birth.156  The couple initially considered
placing their child for adoption, however, the biological father
changed his mind.'57 Later, when Michael's birth mother
was five months pregnant, they fought, and she left for San
Diego.'15  Michael was born in San Diego on February 27,
1991.159
154. The facts of this case have been pieced together from the popular press,
a depublished appellate decision, and the most recent San Diego County Supe-
rior Court decision. Wherever possible, factual information is cited to either of
the two cases available. There are instances where clarity and completeness
required reliance on the popular press. However, all relevant legal issues and
determinations may be found only in the two cases.
155. Under the California Civil Code section 7004 (now Family Code section
7611), the Superior Court for the County of San Diego determined that
Michael's biological father, was not a presumed father. In re Adoption of
Michael H., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 261 (1992), depublished Dec. 31, 1992. Ac-
cordingly, the court terminated his parental rights and referred Michael for
adoption by his prospective adoptive parents, who it appointed as Michael's
temporary guardians. Id. at 261-62.
156. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 2 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
157. Until the birth mother was three months pregnant, the birth father said
he would consider adoption as an alternative for the baby. Michael H., 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 263. Apparently, however, he changed his mind. He asked the birth
mother to move up the date for their wedding, took videos of the baby's so-
nogram, and even attended birthing classes whether the birth mother came
with him or not. Id.
158. According to the popular press, Michael's biological father was arrested
for assaulting his birth mother during this fight, although the charges were
later dropped. Brigitte Greenberg, Dad Cleans Up His Life, Tries To Get Son
Back, CHI. This., Sept. 8, 1993, (Evening Ed.), at 8; Tony Perry, Adoption Battle
Raises Painful Questions; Families: San Diego Case Is The First Under A State
Law Giving Unwed Fathers More Clout in Custody Fights, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 7,
1993, at Al.
159. Michael H., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
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Reminiscent of the Jessica DeBoer case, Michael's pro-
spective adoptive parents harbored concerns about his biolog-
ical father's commitment to and ability to care for Michael.
16 0
Michael's prospective adoptive parents filed formal adop-
tion papers on April 18, 1991.161 The papers did not mention
the biological father's bid for custody in the Arizona courts,1
62
nor did the biological father receive notice that adoption pa-
pers had been filed. 163 The adoption case was tried in Octo-
ber of 1991. The superior court ruled that it was in Michael's
'best interests' to terminate the biological father's parental
rights and authorized the baby's adoption by the prospective
adoptive parents.16 4
Michael's biological father appealed the termination of
his parental rights. While the case was pending in the
Fourth Appellate District Court in San Diego, the California
Supreme Court decided Adoption of Kelsey S.' 65 Based on the
decision in Kelsey S., the Fourth Appellate District reversed
the superior court's termination of parental rights and re-
manded the case back to the superior court to determine
whether Michael's biological father had demonstrated a suffi-
cient commitment to his parental responsibilities. 6 6 While
the appellate court could not rule directly on whether
Michael's biological father had met the standards set forth in
160. Michael's biological father dropped out of high school, and has a history
of drug and alcohol abuse. Alan Abrahamson, Key Court Test Will Set Baby
Boy's Future, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at B1; Perry, supra note 158, at Al.
His family in Prescott, Arizona, where he lives and hopes to bring Michael, has
been portrayed as "dysfunctional" and "alcoholic" with an "unstable lifestyle."
Abrahamson, supra at B1. Michael's biological father also attempted suicide
after he and Michael's mother broke up. In re Adoption of Michael H., 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 261, 263 (1992), depublished Dec. 31, 1992.
161. Michael H., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
162. On February 28, 1991, in Arizona, Michael's biological father filed legal
papers he prepared himself in which he sought to establish paternity and cus-
tody. Id. He did not know until he was contacted by the San Diego County
Department of Social Services that Michael had been born and that the birth
mother had decided to place him for adoption. Abrahamson, supra note 160, at
B1.
163. Id.
164. Abrahamson, supra note 160, at B1.
165. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 2 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
166. In re Adoption of Michael H., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 266 (1992), depub-
lished Dec. 31, 1992.
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Kelsey S., the decision contained numerous inferences that, in
all likelihood, he had.'67
On remand, the superior court found that Michael's bio-
logical father had indeed met the standards set forth in Kel-
sey S., and accordingly should be treated as a presumed fa-
ther.16 Due to the fact that Michael's biological mother
strongly opposed his biological father obtaining custody of
their child,1 69 the choice next faced by the trial judge was not
between placing Michael with his prospective adoptive par-
ents versus his biological father, but rather "placement with
the [prospective adoptive parents] or placement with both
natural parents who will then fight for custody over him."' 70
Given that the custody dispute between the biological parents
must be resolved in family court, the only issue which re-
mained before the superior court was whether the prospec-
tive adoptive parents or the biological father should be
granted guardianship of Michael. 171
On the issue of guardianship, the trial judge decided in
favor of the prospective adoptive parents. Under relevant
law,' 72 since the biological father objected to the guardian-
167. See id. Each time the court compared the facts of the instant case with
Kelsey S. it implied that Michael's biological father had met the Kelsey S. stan-
dard. Id.
168. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 3 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993). Reportedly, Michael's biological
father turned his life around. "[H]e has been clean of cocaine, marijuana,
methamphetamine and alcohol for nearly three years." Perry, supra note 158,
at Al. He also received his high-school equivalency diploma. Id. He gained
employment, and found an apartment in Prescott where he and Michael can
live. Michael H., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264; In the Guardianship of Michael H.,
No. A37092, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
He has also arranged for child care while he is at work. Michael H., 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 264; In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 6
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
169. Michael's birth mother continues to support placement of Michael with
the adoptive parents she chose for him, and has vowed that she will petition for
custody herself rather than let the biological father gain custody of Michael. In
the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. According to the superior court decision:
Probate Code § 1514(a) authorizes establishment of a guardianship "if
it appears necessary or convenient." However, before a court can
award custody of a child to a non-parent without the consent of the
parents, Civil Code § 4600(c) requires that the court "make a finding
that an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child
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ship, there remained two issues for the court to resolve: first,
whether the award of custody to his biological father would
be detrimental to Michael, and second, whether awarding
custody to his prospective adoptive parents was required to
serve Michael's best interests. 173 The court found that remov-
ing Michael from the only home he had ever known would be
a great detriment to his development. 174 The court based this
finding on uncontroverted testimony of four psychologists
that Michael had formed a "clear and strongly attached pri-
mary bond" with his prospective adoptive mother, as well as
the other members of the family which had raised him. 175 All
four experts testified that removing Michael from his home at
this juncture in his life would be detrimental to his future
development. 176 Moreover, Michael's prospective adoptive
mother testified to regressions in Michael's development dur-
ing the four months before the trial.17
7
The court recognized that while Michael's biological fa-
ther had met the standards set forth by Kelsey S., the cir-
cumstances of the case had reached a point where the inevi-
table harm to Michael outweighed the rights of his biological
father. 178 According to the court, "[wihen exercise of parental
rights would be demonstrably harmful to the child, the
court's obligation is to protect the child."179 After challenging
the biological father and prospective adoptive parents to work
together on the issue of visitation for Michael's sake, 1 0 the
and the award to a non-parent is required to serve the best interests of
the child."
Id. at 4. Civil Code section 4600(c) is now Family Code section 3041. See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3041 (West 1995).
173. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 5 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 13-14.
175. Id. at 6.
176. See id. at 5-11.
177. Id. at 11. Michael regressed in his toilet training, and began using a
bottle again. Id. Also, after one of his biological father's scheduled visits,
Michael had several nightmares where he woke up "crying and screaming,....
'Mommy bye, bye. Daddy bye, bye, J.T. [sibling] bye, bye.'" Id.
178. See In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 17 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
179. Id. (referring generally to Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) and
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
180. See id. at 18-20.
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court ordered that guardianship of Michael be granted to his
prospective adoptive parents."'
E. Attachment Theory
The psychology of attachment generally goes unrecog-
nized in case law. For example, in Kelsey S., the California
Supreme Court mentioned the uniqueness of a child's genetic
bond with it's natural parents rather than any relationship a
child forms with the person who cares for her.1 8 2 The dissent
in In re Doe, 1 83 however, recognized the importance of attach-
ment in arguing for the expeditious determination of such
custody decisions.18 4 Moreover, Michael H.'s stage in the de-
velopment of his attachments became a crucial factor in the
San Diego County Superior Court's analysis.18 5 As such, it is
important to understand the psychological implications of re-
moving a child from her adoptive home.
1. Overview of Attachment
Attachment is a term psychologists use to describe the
early relationships between an infant or child and the person
who consistently, though not necessarily perfectly, responds
to her communicated needs.1 8 6 The development and exist-
ence of such a close intimate relationship is a fundamental
requirement of human development.1 8
7
181. Id. at 20.
182. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992) (emphasis ad-
ded). Attachment theory deals with relationships not genetics. A child's biolog-
ical or genetic relationship to her primary caretaker does not make the "attach-
ment." The interpersonal relationship between the caretaker-parent and the
child determines the type and level of attachment. See discussion infra part
II.F.1. For simplicity, only the female pronoun will be used to avoid the com-
plexities of using both gender pronouns or the plural.
183. 627 N.E.2d 648, 656 (Ill.) (Tully, P.J., dissenting), appeal granted 624
N.E.2d 807 (Ill. 1993), and rev'd 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), reh'g denied July 12,
1994, cert denied sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994),
application denied, stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891,
stay denied, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995).
184. Id. at 666-67.
185. See In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, (Cal. Super. Ct.,
San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
186. Eleanor Willemsen, In The Best Interests Of Babies: Attachment Issues
in Infant Placement Decisions (Proposal, on file with author, Psychology De-
partment, Santa Clara University).
187. Id.
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The major concepts in attachment theory are as follows.
First, "[attachment is a basic human need." 8 The develop-
ment of a close attachment relationship between a caregiver
and an infant gives the infant a secure base from which the
child may explore the world around her as a separate per-
son.18 9 This base allows the infant to learn about her sur-
roundings-the world-and relate to other people she en-
counters. 190 Finally, the result of a secure attachment gives
the child a "mental representation of herself as a participant
in a loving relationship with another person."191 This image
then guides the child's future relationships. 192
There exists a critical period in a child's life when attach-
ment must occur or it will not develop at all. 1 9 3 Research has
shown that most infants become attached to their caregivers
by the time they are six to nine months old.' 94 Infants lack-
ing primary caregivers during the early months of life are ca-
pable of forming normal attachments if adopted soon after
their first birthday.195 After an infant has reached eighteen
months, however, she will not readily form attachments to
new caregivers. 196
Attached infants become very disturbed if they are sepa-
rated from their primary caregivers and do not readily accept
substitute caregivers. 197 The leading theorist on attachment,
John Bowlby, found that infants separated from their parents
(caregivers) during their first year exhibited three behaviors:
protest, despair, and detachment.' 9 8 When an infant pro-
tests, she "actively and vigorously" does those things, such as
crying, that would normally call her caregiver to her. 199 She
will be angry that her caregiver, to whom she has developed
an attachment, does not appear.2 0 0 Later, the infant will ex-
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. NEIL R. CARLSON, PSYCHOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF BEHAVIOR 240 (1984)
(citation omitted).
194. Id.
195. Id. (citation omitted).
196. Id. (citation omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 241 (citation omitted).
199. Id.
200. Id.
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perience despair, which is characterized by a lack of respon-
siveness to those around her, and become inactive and with-
drawn.2 ' Finally, in the detachment phase, the infant will
appear normal to her new caregivers, but when reunited with
her initial caregivers she will show no evidence of the former
bond between them.2 °2
2. Role of Attachment in Development
For a child to develop normally, she must learn to ex-
plore and interact with her environment independently. The
presence of an infant's primary caregiver when she first be-
gins to explore offers reassurance. While the new and unfa-
miliar environment causes fear, the caregiver "provides a se-
cure base that the infant can leave.., to see what the world
is like."20 3
A secure attachment provides a host of benefits to a
young child. A child who is securely attached demonstrates a
better ability to explore alone, separate when necessary and
operate independently, than a child who has not formed a se-
cure attachment.2 °4 The same child also has a higher self
awareness.20 5 Secure attachment also translates into better
sensory-motor skills, the ability to master the environment
through one's senses.2 °6 This leads to heightened intellectual
development. Other positive aspects of a secure attachment
include early and more effective language development and
enhanced social skills.20 7
3. Recognition of Attachment Theory in Mentioned
Case Law
In Guardianship of Michael H., the testimony of four
psychologists regarding attachment theory proved very per-
suasive to the San Diego Superior Court. One psychologist
testified that "early attachment and bonding to parent figures
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 242.
204. Eleanor Willemsen, In The Best Interests Of Babies: Attachment Issues
in Infant Placement Decisions: Attachment 101 (unpublished draft, on file with
the author, Psychology Department, Santa Clara University).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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is seen by psychologists as 'the bedrock of socialization.' "208
Michael had developed a "primary attachment to the only
mother he had ever known." 2 0 9 Expert testimony established
that a disruption of this attachment relationship would be
"an extraordinarily dangerous experience for a child"210 po-
tentially leading to "conduct disorders and antisocial
development."21 1
The psychologists testified to the specific and probable ef-
fects of removing Michael from his prospective adoptive par-
ents at age two and one-half. The first expert stated that dis-
ruption of this developmental period would "take away the
child's innate abilities to learn, to grow and to develop in a
normal fashion .. 212 Another testified that removal of a
two and one-half year old from his family risked "ongoing im-
pairment of the child's abilities to trust, feel self confident,
tolerate appropriate separations when older, or form addi-
tional attachments."21 3 Even the expert called to testify on
behalf of Michael's biological father, who sought to remove
Michael, agreed that the proposed removal would be a
"nightmare" for the child.21 4
In the Illinois appellate case, In re Doe,215 the dissent
mentioned the findings of John Bowlby to underscore its con-
tention that these cases should be expedited for the sake of
the children involved. The dissent pointed out that "when no
one person has cared for an infant for more than a few
months, the child should not yet have developed a depen-
dency on any one person at the time of placement. Thus,
208. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 7 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
209. Id. at 15.
210. Id. at 7.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 8 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
214. Id. at 9-10.
215. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648 (Ill.), appeal granted 624 N.E.2d 807 (Ill.
1993), and rev'd 638 N.E.2d 181 (IM.), reh'g denied July 12, 1994, cert. denied
sub nom. Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994), application denied,
stay denied sub nom. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 891, stay denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1084 (1995).
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placing the infant in a new setting should not have an ad-
verse impact on him."216
Consequently, custody battles for infants in independent
adoption situations become, in part, issues of timing. If not
rectified soon enough, removal will harm the child, yet early
disposition of the case will likely involve removal from the
prospective adoptive home and placement with the birth par-
ent who sought custody.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The above background material introduces the reader to
a complex area of independent adoption law: What happens
when a birth father contests the proposed adoption of his
child after the child is in the custody of her prospective adop-
tive parents. Fortunately, such contests are rare. Their rar-
ity, however, does not make them any less devastating for all
the parties involved. A distinct tension exists in the law
among the constitutionally protected rights of the biological
father, the lack of protection for the prospective adoptive par-
ents, and, in many cases, the inability of the court to consider
the actual effect of its decision on the child. Accordingly, the
court loses sight of what is, and should be, of paramount im-
portance-protecting the well-being of the child.
IV. ANALYSIS
The psychological study of infant attachment discussed
above provides the framework for subsequent analysis of this
problem.217 As the Superior Court of San Diego recognized,
"[w]hen exercise of parental rights would be demonstrably
harmful to the child, the court's obligation is to protect the
child."218 Protecting the child should mean preventing harm
to the child and should spark a detriment analysis. 2 19 The
challenge is in shifting the focus of the court away from the
rights of the adults involved, whether they are the constitu-
216. Id. at 664 n.1 (Tully, P.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, apparently rejected attachment as a factor. See
supra text accompanying notes 54-59.
217. See supra part II.E.
218. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 17 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
219. A detriment analysis involves "a clear showing that [award of custody to
the non-parent] is essential to avert harm to the child." Id. at 12 (quoting from
In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974)).
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tional rights of the biological father or the statutory rights of
the prospective adoptive parents, and placing the focus on the
impact that the decision requested of the court will have on
the child. If the impact will be harmful, then that avenue
should not be pursued.
A. Rights of the Biological Father
The supremacy of the rights of the biological father over
those of the prospective adoptive parents or the interest of his
own child proved to be the dispositive factor in the disposition
of the cases determining custody of Jessica DeBoer and Baby
Richard. 220 Under state law, the Iowa court could not con-
sider the effect of its required decision on Jessica.2
2 1 Iowa
law dictates that in the absence of the biological parents' con-
sent to the child's adoption, the court may not consider
whether the adoption promotes the welfare and best interests
of the child.222
While the state may have a legitimate interest in
preventing children from being removed from homes and
placed for adoption over the objection of the biological par-
ents, the wording of this statute backfires when it is applied
in cases where the child has been placed for adoption by one
parent and the other parent later objects. It backfires be-
cause the court will not hear evidence and testimony regard-
ing the effect a change in custody will have on the child in
question. Thus, protection of the child, in the sense of avoid-
ing harm to the youngster, falls victim to biology. Likewise,
as in the case of Baby Richard, the court fails to consider
whether adoption serves either the welfare or the best inter-
est of the child, absent a showing of unfitness or abandon-
ment on the part of the biological parent seeking custody.
The disposition of these cases underscores the problem
by presenting the unconscionable result that a newly named
genetic father can upset a potential adoption or even over-
turn a final adoption, despite the fact that this may be ex-
tremely detrimental to the child.223 These harsh outcomes,
however, need not occur in California.
220. See supra part II.A.1-2.
221. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 660 n.30 (Mich.), stay denied sub nom.
DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
222. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
223. See supra part II.A.1-2.
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Following the line of United States Supreme Court cases
which delineate the rights of biological fathers,224 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statutory dis-
tinction between presumed and natural fathers which gave
fathers determined to be "presumed" rather than "natural"
more rights in adoption custody decisions.225 The Kelsey S.
decision eliminates the distinction between natural and pre-
sumed fathers only in cases where an otherwise natural fa-
ther under the statute has demonstrated a "full commitment"
to raise the child. Consent is not required of a natural father
who fails to demonstrate a full commitment to custody.226
With this distinction eliminated, the consent of the birth fa-
ther meeting the Kelsey S. standard is required for the adop-
tion of the child.227
The court also determined that biology is not enough; the
birth father must make an adequate showing of commitment
to the child in order to contest an adoption. The state's inter-
ests in the child's well being is important and deserves pro-
tection. The standard set by the court requires consideration
of the birth father's conduct both before and after the child's
birth. He must demonstrate his willingness to take custody
of the child; further, his motivation may not simply be to
block the adoption. Relevant to a determination of commit-
ment are the father's acknowledgment of paternity, helping
the mother with pregnancy and birth expenses to the best of
his ability, and the speed at which he takes legal action.228
While these standards appear straightforward, they cre-
ate some uncertainty. The court stated that the father must
attempt to assume his responsibilities as soon has he "knows
or reasonably should know" of the birth mother's preg-
221nancy.  What if the birth mother does not tell him of the
pregnancy, and he finds out later, months or even years after
the child is born? If he then attempts to gain custody, will his
lack of consent be determinative? He took action as soon as
he found out about the child. His commitment is genuine.
224. See supra notes 21, 141.
225. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
227. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52.
229. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992).
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The door appears to be left open to these types of chal-
lenges-even to final adoptions.23 °
The scenario just described illustrates a significant loop-
hole in the Kelsey S. decision. The wording used by the court
activates the start of any action by the birth father toward
full commitment "[o]nce he knows or reasonably should know
of the pregnancy."231 A birth father may not reasonably be
expected to know of a pregnancy if he has had no contact with
the birth mother for the duration of the pregnancy. If the fa-
ther, upon finding out about his child, had attempted to
regain custody before the adoption had been finalized, he
might have succeeded in his challenge (under Family Code
section 8815 in effect until January 1, 1995).232 Now, how-
ever, the new section 8815 requires that action be taken by
the biological father during the first four months after the
child's birth in order to succeed.233 Yet, if he meets the Kelsey
S. standards, a birth father may make the case that his pa-
rental rights were wrongly, falsely or unjustly terminated,
and that he was ready, willing and able to assume responsi-
bility at the time of the child's birth. This may occur years
after the adoption has been finalized. Thus, Kelsey S., while
properly bringing a known father into the picture, may also
provide an opportunity for an unknown father to appear later
and challenge the custody or adoption of his child.
Kelsey S. does not address the proper disposition of the
custody case. It merely sets forth the rights the birth father
has to contest the adoption and the standards to determine
whether or not he may properly exercise those rights. The
California Supreme Court left the lower courts to grapple
with what to do next.
Until January 1, 1995, once determined to be a presumed
father (either by meeting the conditions of Family Code sec-
tion 7611 or the standards of Kelsey S.), the father may con-
test the adoption by withdrawing his consent under Family
Code section 8815. According to the statute, "[ijf the court
finds that withdrawal of the consent to adoption is reasonable
230. This is almost exactly what occurred in Illinois to Baby Richard, the
difference being that the biological father knew of the pregnancy, but not of the
birth or the adoption. See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
231. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1236.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
233. See supra part II.C.2.
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in view of all the circumstances and that withdrawal of the
consent is in the child's best interest, the court shall approve
the withdrawal of consent."23 4 Thus, granting custody to the
birth father is not automatic-he must first show that his
withdrawal of consent is reasonable and that it is in the
child's best interest for him not to consent to the adoption.
The statute next articulates its test for best interest de-
terminations. A best interest analysis includes,
but is not limited to, an assessment of the child's age, the
extent of bonding with the prospective adoptive parent or
parents, the extent of bonding or the potential to bond
with the birth parent or parents, and the ability of the
birth parent or parents to provide adequate and proper
care and guidance to the child.235
In California, a best interest determination can easily accom-
modate the incorporation of attachment theory.
Critical components of attachment theory, the age of the
child and the extent of bonding with the prospective adoptive
parents, are already incorporated in the best interest analy-
sis. A court should look at a child's age in terms of attach-
ment development in an infant. Research has demonstrated
that attachments must form between six and eighteen
months of age or they may not develop at all.236 Moreover, as
demonstrated by the testimony regarding Michael H., at two
and one-half a child is "at the entry phase [ages two to five] of
the most important developmental period in a person's
life."237 Disruption at this point impacts a child's innate abil-
ities of learning and normal development, including ability to
trust and feel self confident. It also impacts negatively on a
child's ability to form additional attachments and tolerate ap-
propriate separations in the future.238 As to bonding, a psy-
chologist can study the interaction of the child and the pro-
spective adoptive parents to determine the extent and
quality of attachment with the prospective adoptive parents.
The statute also mandates, however, an examination of
the "potential to bond with the birth parent," as well as the
234. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8815(d) (West 1995) (emphasis added).
235. Id.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
237. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 7 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 197-202, 208-14.
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birth parent's ability to provide care and guidance to the
child.2 39 Without looking at the psychology of attachment,
these factors weigh heavily in favor of placement with the
birth father. In Kelsey S. the court characterized the "loss to
the child" in terms of the "genetic bond" shared with its natu-
ral parents to conclude that absent a showing of unfitness on
the part of the father, "[the] child is ill served by allowing its
mother effectively to preclude the child from ever having a
meaningful relationship with its only other biological par-
ent."240 This holds true, however, only to the extent that an
attachment by the child to another caregiver has not been
formed. Once that attachment forms and exists long enough,
detrimental effects are inflicted on the child by forcibly
breaking a critical psychological and developmental bond in
favor of genetics.24 1
As of January 1, 1995 the foregoing analysis changed.
The court is no longer to be involved in performing a best in-
terests analysis. Under section 8815, operative January 1,
1995, if the birth father withdraws his consent within the
120 day time frame, the prospective adoptive parents have no
recourse.2 4 2 They must relinquish the child.243 This change
in the law greatly expands the power and influence of the
birth father without due consideration of the prospective
adoptive parents or the child.
In Adoption of Michael H.,244 the California Appellate
Court remanded the superior court's termination of the pa-
rental rights of Michael's biological father back for disposi-
tion in light of the standards set forth by Kelsey S.241 While
the appellate court stated that it did not have sufficient facts
before it to make the determination since the issue had not
been before the lower court, it repeatedly inferred that the
standards had been met by Michael's biological father.246 On
remand, the superior court determined that the actions taken
by Michael's biological father complied with the Kelsey S. re-
239. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8815(d) (West 1995)
240. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992).
241. See supra part II.E.
242. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
243. See supra part II.C.2.
244. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261 (1992), depublished Dec. 31, 1992.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
246. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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quirements. 4 7 As a result, his lack of consent meant that
Michael's prospective adoptive parents could not finalize his
adoption.
The superior court, however, did not automatically con-
clude that custody of Michael must then necessarily go to his
biological father. Michael's biological father objected to the
adoption. He also objected to the prospective adoptive par-
ents retaining guardianship of Michael. However, the birth
father's compliance with Kelsey S. did not prove dispositive.
The court took its charge of protecting the child very seri-
ously. Given the facts of the case, and the strength of expert
testimony regarding the likely harm to Michael from any
change in custody, the judge properly decided that Michael
should remain in the only home he has ever known.248
B. "Rights" of Adoptive Parents
At least one commentator described the rights of adop-
tive parents as a specter.249 Without parental consent to an
adoption, the prospective adoptive parents, in reality, have
very little recourse except to return the child if so ordered by
the court.
The plight of Jessica DeBoer underscores the problem
area faced in independent adoptions-lack of standing for
prospective adoption parents.25 ° When the Iowa court re-
voked the temporary custody grant to Jessica's prospective
adoptive parents, they became "third parties" in relation to
Jessica, and thus had no substantive right to custody of the
child they had raised since birth.25 '
In Guardianship of Michael H.,252 the superior court cir-
cumvented the standing issue. The birth mother so strongly
247. See supra text accompanying note 168.
248. See supra part II.D.2.
249. See Janet Hopkins Dickenson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adop-
tive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 990 (1991).
250. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. The Michigan Supreme
Court rejected the arguments put forth by Jessica's prospective adoptive par-
ents and affirmed the appellate court ruling that they lacked standing to claim
custody of the child. Legally, Jessica's prospective adoptive parents were
"third parties" with respect to her. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 662, 663
(Mich.), stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied,
114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
251. See supra note 83.
252. No. A37092, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div.,
1993).
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objected to the birth father gaining custody of their biological
child, she vowed she would revoke her consent and fight
Michael's birth father for custody.253 Accordingly, the judge's
decision was not between the biological father and adoptive
parents, but between the biological father and adoptive par-
ents with the knowledge that should custody go to the biologi-
cal father, another custody battle for Michael would ensue be-
tween the birth parents.254 After the termination of adoption
proceedings, Michael's prospective adoptive parents re-
quested guardianship be granted to them. Guardianship
does not require the relinquishment of the biological father's
parental rights so, unlike adoption, it does not create a new
legal family. It does, however, allow Michael to remain in his
home. 255
The guardianship determination required the court to
find that awarding custody of Michael to his biological father
would be detrimental to Michael, and that remaining with his
prospective adoptive parents served Michael's best interests.
Although determined on the basis of the same evidence, the
two tests are distinct. The finding of a detriment was "in-
tended to limit placement with a non-parent to extreme
cases and to shift the focus of the inquiry away from the par-
ent's failings and toward the child's protection."218 Accord-
ingly, a finding of detriment requires "a clear showing that
[award of custody to the non-parent] is essential to avert
harm to the child."257 On the other hand, the best interest of
the child is a matter of judicial discretion.258
The only new piece of California legislation that ad-
dresses on the fears of the prospective adoptive parents and
attempts to alleviate their plight is the creation of an identi-
fied adoption.259 While the purpose of this legislation, as
stated in committee analysis, is to "protect the right of a birth
parent to select adoptive parents in this alternative form of
253. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 172-81.
256. In the Guardianship of Michael H., No. A37092, slip op. at 12 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993).
257. Id. (quoting from In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1974)).
258. Id.
259. See supra part II.C.3.
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agency adoption,"2 6 ° it does serve indirectly to alleviate the
problem under scrutiny here. Since relinquishment differs
fundamentally from consent,26 1 identified adoptions might al-
lay fears of prospective adoptive parents that the birth par-
ents will change their minds and request return of the child.
Insecurity abounds in independent adoptions due to the lack
of any time limits on consent orders.
Other legislation eliminates rights previously held by
prospective adoptive parents. Under new section 8815, the
prospective adoptive parents lose their consideration under
the old section 8815 which had required a best interest analy-
sis of the child's bonding with them.26 2 They go unheard so
long as the child has been in their custody under four months.
C. "Rights" of the Child
The Jessica DeBoer cases show that Iowa does not con-
sider the welfare or interests of the child in cases where a
parent contests a pending adoption.263 The example of Baby
Richard illustrates the strength of a biological father's rights;
his consent will be required, and, if not properly obtained or
absent a showing of parental unfitness, the welfare or inter-
ests of the child will not be considered. 264 However, Michi-
gan and California courts, to varying degrees, do consider the
welfare and interests of the child.265
Jessica's prospective adoptive parents wanted Michigan
courts to hear the case in order to have Jessica's interests
considered. The Michigan court reasoned that, as the law
currently stands, courts of each state are free to fashion their
own law regarding family relationships. Michigan could not
find a decision rendered in Iowa unenforceable simply be-
cause it did not hold a hearing on the interests of the child.266
This raises another issue-different substantive laws in each
state when adoptions cross state lines. The 1969 version of
260. CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYsIs, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
BILL No. A.B. 3456, June 30, 1992 available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Cacomm
File.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.
262. See supra part II.C.2.
263. See supra part II.A.2.
264. See supra part II.A.1.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 83, 140, 146, 168-87.
266. See supra part II.A.2.
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the Uniform Adoption Act did not receive much support.
26 7
The Act, however, has been revised.
268 Due to the national
attention paid to egregious cases, such as those of Baby Rich-
ard and Jessica DeBoer, hopefully more support will be given
to the new Uniform Adoption Act.
The Illinois Court of Appeals correctly recognized that
children do not belong to either adoptive or biological parents.
Accordingly, in adoption custody cases, the child is the real
party in interest. As the real party in interest, the child's in-
terests supersede a biological father's right to custody. More-
over, the court astutely emphasized that the best interest of
the child is not a factor to be balanced as part of an equation.
Rather it stands on its own, "inviolate and impregnable."
Adoption offers important benefits to children, not the least of
which is an alternative to foster care and, consequently, the
opportunity to form a primary attachment relationship which
promotes better adjusted, more secure individuals. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court, however, reduced the findings of the ap-
peals court to wishful thinking.
269
Hope for a shift in the courts' focus exists in California.
The guidance offered by the state's highest court in Kelsey S.
stops at the point of determining when the court requires the
consent of a "natural" father in an adoption proceeding. As
discussed above, the best interest analysis allows for a criti-
cal assessment of the child's attachment. However, this is in
danger of expiring. Further, in Guardianship of Michael H.,
the court correctly determined, under the detriment and best
interest analyses required for guardianship determinations
in favor of non-parents, that while the biological father had
done all he could, the potential harm to the child of granting
him custody outweighed his rights.
2 71
D. Inadequacy of Current Law and Recent Legislation
While the recent legislative changes discussed above are
important and significant, they focus on the rights and needs
of the birth parent placing a child for adoption. They make
no provisions for the birth parent, usually the birth father,
not placing the child for adoption. Moreover, they do not sig-
267. See supra part II.B.
268. See supra part II B.
269. See supra part IIA.i.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 173-81.
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nificantly alter the rights or address the needs and fears of
the adoptive parents. Finally, no changes regarding protec-
tions for the child at issue are mentioned.2 7'
The provision of counseling for the birth parent(s) plac-
ing a child for adoption under Family Code section 8801.5
has taken effect.2 72 While this marks a significant change
from the previous process, which did not require counseling,
it does not go far enough. Counseling is not provided for the
birth father, regardless of his statutory status, if he is not
placing the child.273 The assumption might be made that if
the statute requires his consent for the adoption then he will
be counseled. However, the Family Code states that only the
"birth parent placing a child for adoption shall be advised of
his or her rights by an adoption service provider."274 More-
over, the legislative history denotes that part of the purpose
of the legislation was to clarify that only the birth parent
placing the child receives counseling.275 The intent of the leg-
islation was not to require counseling for non-placing par-
ents.276 Accordingly, a "natural" father would receive no
counseling. Yet, he may wish to obtain custody of the child.
In addition, he may be able to meet the requirements of Kel-
sey S. in order to move himself into the category of a pre-
sumed father from whom consent is required. Thus, this leg-
islation does nothing to prevent a birth father who can make
the requisite showing from coming forward.
The 120 day limit for the placing parent's revocation of
consent is laudable.277 By making consent permanent within
the first four months after placement, the legislation com-
ports with the guidelines of attachment theory. In other
words, removal of an infant at four months, while difficult or
even devastating for the prospective adoptive parents, will
not likely have a significant detrimental effect on the child's
future development. 78 It also provides finality for adoptive
271. See supra part II.C.
272. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5 (West 1995) (operative Jan. 1, 1995).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
274. Family Law-Adoption-Independent, ch. 758, 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv.
No. 9, §§ 3426, 3431 (West) (addition of § 8801.5 to the Family Code).
275. CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
BILL No. S.B. 792, May 4, 1993 available in LEXIS, Cal Library, Cacomm File.
276. Id. The analysis of Senate Bill 792 discusses the desire to give people
sufficient information before they make the decision to give up their child. Id.
277. See supra part II.C.2.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 193-202.
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parents. They know that on the 121st day the birth parent or
parents who placed the child for adoption cannot ask for the
child back.
However, this provision is far from perfect. While it pro-
vides finality for the prospective adoptive parents on the
121st day, it also treats them harshly if the placing birth par-
ent(s) revokes consent during the four month period. Family
Code section 8815(b) mandates immediate return of the child.
Moreover, if the prospective adoptive parents have legitimate
concerns regarding the fitness of the birth parent they have
little recourse. They may report their concerns, but the child
must still be returned.279 This outcome could prove very dan-
gerous to a child whose birth parent or parents are, in fact,
unfit.
Thus, the legislation fails to provide adequate protec-
tions and safeguards to very young children who may need
protection. Specifically, excluding the non-placing parent
(usually the biological father) from counseling opens the door
to potential custody battles. The 120 day limit treats pro-
spective adoptive parents very harshly. It also affords no pro-
tection to the child if bona fide questions of parental fitness
exist.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Provide Counseling to Non-Placing Parent
Advisement of rights and counseling should not be lim-
ited to the parent placing the child for adoption. The cases
discussed above illustrate instances where the non-placing
parent, the biological father, refused to consent to the adop-
tion. Counseling would advise him of the appropriate legal
action he needs to take. Counseling might also encourage
him to think his decision through and may even change his
mind about petitioning for custody of his child.
Accordingly, Family Code section 8801.5(a) should be
amended to read:
(a) Each birth parent placing a cbild fr adoption
[from whom consent is required] shall be advised of his or
her rights by an adoption service provider, or in the case
of a birth parent who is neither a resident of, nor physi-
cally present in, this state, by a representative of an
279. See supra part II.C.2.
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agency licensed or authorized to accept consents to adop-
tion in the state in which the birth parent resides or is
physically present for a purpose unrelated to an
adoption.28 °
This small change allows a birth father to be adequately in-
formed, and may prevent him from revoking his consent.
B. Develop Incentives for Birth Mother to Identify Birth
Father
A further provision to prevent birth fathers from appear-
ing unexpectedly to thwart adoptions involves providing the
proper incentives for birth mothers to accurately identify the
birth father. Once identified, the proper consent and counsel-
ing actions can be more easily taken by the appropriate
agency.
Every birth mother, regardless of the type of adoption,
should be required to identify accurately the birth father if he
is known to her. It is the legislature's function to design the
proper and most effective form; the possibilities, however,
range from criminal or civil sanctions to signing an affidavit
under penalty of perjury after taking an oath. The impor-
tance and need for this information should be explained to
her as part of her pre-placement advisement of rights and
adoption procedures.
A birth mother may wish that the birth father remain
unidentified, often with good reason. She should be required
nonetheless to disclose his identity to a judge. The birth
mother should be required to inform a judge in camera of her
reasons, then if the judge deems them adequate, the identifi-
cation requirement shall not apply in her case. Whether the
biological father remains unidentified should be left to the
judge's discretion. Potentially adequate reasons for a biologi-
cal father to remain unidentified might include, but should
not be limited to: incest, rape or history of violence toward the
birth mother by the biological father.
280. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5(a) (West 1995). The change strikes out the
reference to placing parent and includes the reference to parents from whom
the statutes require consent.
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C. Amend Family Code Section 8815 to Safeguard Child
Family Code section 8815(c) should be amended to in-
clude some means to protect a child from perceived harm.
The statute should be changed to read as follows:
(c) If the person or persons with whom the child has
been placed have concerns that the birth parent or par-
ents requesting return of the child are unfit or present a
danger of harm to the child, that person's or those per-
son's only option is to rcport their -eneccas to the incsti
gating adoption.agen1y and the appropiat ehild welfare
ageney. Thc-c onorn h. n..ot be a basis for fAlure to
immcdiately rctu the ch-ld.2" ' [option is to request a
hearing as to the fitness of the birth parents. The hearing
shall be held within 15 days of the request for return of
the child. Until the outcome of the hearing, the child shall
remain with the person or persons with whom the child
has been placed. If the outcome of the hearing finds the
birth parent or parents fit or presenting no danger to the
child, then the child shall be immediately returned.]
This change protects the interests of the child and the pro-
spective adoptive parents. For the vast majority of birth par-
ents fitness will not be an issue, and this action will not likely
be taken. A safeguard is necessary, however, for those cases
where the fitness of the birth parents can legitimately be
questioned. Once questioned, parental fitness is an issue for
the court to decide, not the agency or the Department of So-
cial Services.
D. Follow Michael H. Example in Protracted Cases
Guardianship of Michael H. provides excellent precedent
for protracted custody decisions. 28 2 Protecting the child
should always be the paramount focus of juvenile law. Ac-
cordingly, in situations where the child has formed a primary
attachment to the prospective adoptive parent and the paren-
tal rights of the birth parent petitioning for custody can be
legally terminated, a two-part detriment/best interest analy-
sis should be performed in order to decide the adoption ques-
tion. If the parental rights of the birth parent petitioning for
custody cannot be legally terminated, then a two-part detri-
281. Id. § 8815(c) (West 1995). The portion struck out will be removed. The
wording in brackets is added to indicate the proposed change.
282. See supra part II.D.2.
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ment/best interest analysis should be performed in order to
decide the question of guardianship.
A proper detriment analysis will determine whether the
award of custody to the birth parent will be detrimental to
the child. In determining detriment, an assessment of the
impact on the child's development by removing her from her
only known home should be conducted. This analysis ensures
that the child remains the true party in interest to the pro-
ceedings surrounding her custody.
A proper best interest analysis would follow the detri-
ment analysis and rely on the discretion of the court. The
test should be the same as that currently in Family Code sec-
tion 8815(d) which reads:
Consideration of the child's best interests shall include,
but is not limited to, an assessment of the child's age, the
extent of bonding with the prospective adoptive parent or
parents, the extent of bonding or potential to bond with
the birth parents or parents, and the ability of the birth
parent or parents to provide adequate and proper care
and guidance to the child.2"3
E. Need for Uniformity
Critical to the success of adoption reform in any one state
is nationwide uniformity in adoption laws. The California
legislature should wholeheartedly support the redrafting of
the Uniform Adoption Act in order to find it acceptable to the
people of this state for ratification.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tension among the varied level and competing rights
of biological fathers, prospective adoptive parents, and the
child can be resolved. Initial identification of the biological
father decreases the likelihood of a protracted custody battle
later. Once identified, he will be included in counseling ses-
sions to be advised of his rights. Accordingly, any attempt to
regain custody will begin prior to placement of the infant
with prospective adoptive parents. Identification and resolu-
tion of the issue prior to placement greatly increases the like-
lihood of permanent placements in independent adoptions.
In the unlikely event of a protracted battle for custody post-
283. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8815(d) (West 1995).
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placement, excellent precedent for deciding the case in favor
of preventing undue harm to the child, as illustrated by the
San Diego Superior Court decision In the Guardianship of
Michael H., should be followed.
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